In the course of my research, I analyzed evidence of governmental agreements with Huawei for cloud computing and e-government services. My investigation began with a dataset compiled by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Reconnecting Asia Project, which documented 70 such agreements from 2006 to April 2021. These partnerships spanned the globe, with a pronounced concentration in the Global South. Expanding on this foundation, I identified 41 additional instances of Huawei Cloud and e-government agreements signed by governmental agencies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) between April 2021 and May 2024.

This agreement surge corroborates industry reports that Huawei is pivoting towards cloud services as a strategic focus in its business model. The quantitative analysis of these findings is remarkable: from 2006 to April 2021 (approximately 15 years), there were 70 agreements, averaging 4.67 per year. In stark contrast, from April 2021 to May 2024 (about three years) saw 41 agreements, averaging 13.67 per year. This represents a staggering 192.7% increase in the average annual rate of these partnerships, underscoring Huawei's aggressive expansion in the governmental cloud services sector.

Interestingly, while the data points to robust growth in cloud services, there seems to be a lack of press statements regarding national cloud data centers built by Huawei and the implementation of e-government products post-2020. This information asymmetry coincides with the escalating distrust of Huawei by the United States and its allies, hinting at a strategic shift by Huawei towards decreased transparency. This hypothesis gains further traction from evidence uncovered by journalists in Honduras, which revealed that Huawei mandated non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) in its government partnerships in Honduras. These NDAs may be a contributing factor to the scarcity of public reporting, as nations are contractually bound to maintain confidentiality.

My research also illuminates Huawei's multifaceted, soft-power approach to entering international governmental ecosystems. A consistent thread across these partnerships is Huawei's initial engagement through educational initiatives, most notably its "Seeds for the Future" program. This program, offering cloud computing training to young people in host countries, serves as a precursor to formal cloud agreements in virtually all cases studied. This pattern suggests that tracking the deployment of these educational programs could serve as a predictive indicator of Huawei's cloud service expansion targets. By investing in local human capital, Huawei not only engenders goodwill but also cultivates a workforce versed in and potentially loyal to its technological ecosystem.

Another interesting finding is Huawei's use of nationalistic branding in its governmental cloud product launches. The company employs a consistent formula across different countries: "by [country name] for [country name]." This rhetorical strategy seems designed to foster a sense of national ownership and pride, potentially mitigating concerns about foreign technology control and making the solutions more palatable to local populations.

The geographic distribution of these agreements is also significant. Concentrating partnerships in the Global South could suggest a strategic focus on developing nations. These countries often face a pressing need for technological infrastructure and limited resources for rigorous security assessments.

Significantly, most countries that have signed cloud and e-government agreements with Huawei are classified as "Partly Free" or "Not Free" by Freedom House. This correlation raises critical questions about the intersection of technology and governance. Are these nations drawn to Huawei e-government services and products not only for its technology but also for its model of digital governance?

China's approach to internet and data management is characterized by strong state control, extensive surveillance, and restricted digital rights—a model often termed "digital authoritarianism." Huawei's localization techniques and a heavy emphasis on training and education potentially export China's digital authoritarianism governance philosophy. Features like deep packet inspection and advanced facial recognition in Huawei's safe city solutions align closely with authoritarian control methods.

For leaders in these less-free countries, Huawei's technology may offer a means to emulate China's model of digital governance. Cloud services and e-government platforms provide unprecedented access to citizen data, internet traffic, and communication patterns. In the hands of an authoritarian government, such tools could be used to monitor dissidents, censor content, or manipulate public opinion.

This alignment between Huawei's technological capabilities and the governance needs of less-free states may be a key, underexplored factor in the company's success in the Global South.